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FEDERAL POWER TO PROSECUTE VIOLENCE
AGAINST MINORITY GROUPS
THE gulf between American ideals and social practices is sharply revealed
in the recent Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights.' Perhaps
the most serious discrepancy noted by the Committee is the continued use of
violence by both private citizens 2 and public officersP as a weapon for con-
1. Pnsmzx's Coamurrm ox Civrm RIGHTS, To Svcuna THESE: RIGHTs (1947),
hereafter referred to as Crv. RTs. REP. The committee was created by Exec. Order No.
9809, 11 FED. REG. 14153 (1946).
2. Crv. RTs. Ran., supra note 1, at 6, 20-4; FnAENxL, THE SupEm= Cour &m
Civn. LIBreRTs 43 (1937). The announcement of the creation of a Civil Rights Section
in the Department of Justice in 1939 brought immediate reports of such violence (sec note
76 infra) : "'Low class whites' were said to be forcing negroes from their homes ....
Workers in a southern cigar factory sought protection against the Ku Klux Klan....
Sharecroppers said they were being evicted from the farms they had worked. ... A
witness before a Congressional committee reported that he had been assaulted as a result
of his testimony ... A request was made for an investigation of alleged vigilante activity
against labor organizations on the west coast...." Schveinhaut, The Citil Liberties
Section of the Department of Justice, 1 BH.L OF RIGHTS RFv. 206, 207 (1941). The Presi-
dent's Committee on Civil Rights points out that lynching remains a serious threat to
civil rights. "The decade from 1936 through 1946 saw at least 43 lynchings. No person
received the death penalty, and the majority of the guilty persons were not even prose-
cuted... for seven of the years from 1937 to 1946 ... the conservative estimates of
the Tuskegee Institute show that 226 persons were rescued from threatened lynching.
Over 200 of these were Negroes... .. Crv. RTs. REP., supra note 1, at 23-4.
Other minorities have been attacked. Following the Supreme Court's decision in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), "hundreds of attacks upon the
[Jehovah's] Witnesses were reported to the Department of Justice... At Kennebunk,
Maine, the Kingdom Hall was burned. At Rockville, Maryland, the police assisted a
mob in dispersing a Bible meeting. At Litchfield, Illinois, practically the entire town
mobbed a company of some sixty Witnesses.... Several Witnesses were charged with
riotous conspiracy at Connersville, Indiana, their attorney was mobbed, and he and
several other Witnesses who had attended the arraignment were beaten.... At Jackson,
Mississippi, members of a veterans' organization... forcibly removed a number of
Witnesses and their trailer homes from the town." Rotnem and Folsom, Rccent Re-
strictions Upon Religious Liberty, 36 Am. PorL' SCL Rzv. 1053, 1051 (1942). Cf. Catlette
v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (C.C.A. 4th 1943). And Japanese-Americans on the West
Coast have been subjected to personal violence. Cmua, FEr _mA PaorcrIon oF CiviM
RIGHTS 17 (1947), and authorities cited therein, id. at 17 n. 24; Statement of Japanese
American Citizens League, Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Conmnittec on
the Judiciary on H.R. 5673, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1943).
3. "The frequency with which such cases arise is proof that improper police con-
duct is still widespread. . . ." Crv. R-rs. RaP., supra note 1, at 25; testifying before this
committee, J. Edgar Hoover referred to a particular jail where "it v.-as seldom that a
Negro man or woman was incarcerated who was not given a severe beating, which started
off with a pistol whipping and ended with a rubber hose!' Id. at 26. Other typical in-
stances have been: allowing trusties physically to attack white juvenile prisoners who had
attempted an escape, ibid.; whipping a Negro with a bullwhip and forcing him to jump
into a river where he drowned, Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746 (C.C.A. 5th 1947) ;
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trolling Negroes and other minorities through fear.4 Although repression of
violence is peculiarly the province of government, local agencies charged with
the maintenance of order often fail to provide these groups with adequate
protection.5 Under such circumstances, then, the federal government may
well be the only medium through which elimination of the practices reported
by the President's Committee can be attempted.6
beating and kicking a falsely arrested Negro so that he died, Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945) ; forcing Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag and drink quantities
of castor oil, Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (C.C.A. 4th 1943); branding a
Negro boy with a red-hot iron to obtain a confession, United States v. Sutherland, 37 F.
Supp. 344 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
4. ". . . lynching is the ultimate threat by which his inferior status is driven home
to the Negro. As a terrorist device, it reinforces all the other disabilities placed upon him."
Cirv. RTs. REP., supra note 1, at 24; Fraenkel, The Federal Civil Rights Law, 31 MINN.
L. REv. 301, 302 (1947) ; "A lynching is not merely a punishment against an individual
but a disciplinary device against the Negro group." MYR T., AN A .vm~cAN DiL=IxMA
561 (1944); ". . . lynching is a symbolic act .... For every lynching committed there
are thousands of threats of lynching." Constitutional Basis for Federal Anti-Lyncing
Legislation, 6 LAW. GuILD REv. 643, 646 (1946). Raper cites many instances of lynchings
and violence which he suggests were motivated by a desire to maintain economic domina-
tion. RAPER, THE TR.AGEDY OF LYNCHING 36-7, 48-51, 56-8, 73-4, 172-3, 201, 270, 285,
313, 317-8, 340-2, 350-1, 466 (1933). Cf. CAYTON AND MITcliwL, BLACX WoRERS AND
THE NEW UNIONS 439-45 (1939) ; WHITE, ROPE AND FAGGOT 11 (1929).
Compare the broader problem facing the United Nations, discussed in Lemkln,
Genocide As A Critne -Under International Law, 4 UNIrrm NATIONS BuLL. 70 (1948), and
an attempted solution in the Genocide Convention adopted by the United Nations, Decem-
ber 11, 1946. Yearbook of the United Nations 254 (1946-7).
5. "In certain states the White population can threaten and do violence to the minor-
ity member with little or no fear of legal reprisal." Civ. RTs. REp., supra note 1, at 29.
"Punishment of lynchers is not accepted as the responsibility of state or local govern-
ments. . . ." Id. at 23. In the Screws case, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), where a sheriff and his
deputies beat a Negro to death without justification, the State of Georgia refused to
take action.' See note 34, infra. In the Catlette case, 132 F.2d 902 (C.C.A. 4th 1943),
where a sheriff led a mob in violence against Jehovah's Witnesses, "state authorities in
West Virginia made no effort to punish the persons responsible. . . ." CRuR, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 156. In Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (C.C.A. 5th 1944), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 873 (1945), the defendant had used violence to make girls act as prostitutes, but
"both the State and local governments failed to bring Pierce to account." CARR, op. Cit.
supra note 2, at 118. Cf. J. Edgar Hoover's statement to the President's Committee on
Civil Rights: "We have had cases involving civil rights where we had no cooperation
from local authorities. In one instance, the sheriff boasted that he intended to take no
action." Cxv. RTs. REP., supra note 1, at 124.
Concerning the effectiveness of state civil rights laws, see KoNvITz, THE CONsTrITU-
TION AND Crvii. RIGHTS 121 and Part 2 (1947); Comment, The New York State Com-
nission Against Discrimination: A New Technique For An Old Problem, 56 YAI L. J.
837 (1947). See also Bob-lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 68 Sup. Ct. 358 (1948), and
cases cited therein.
6. The need for effective protection of ciMil rights is particularly serious in postwar
periods. CARR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 19. For anti-minority reactions after other wars,
see WEc'rE, WHEN JOHNNY COMES MARCHING HOME (1944) (anti-Scotch, pp, 24-5;
anti-Negro, pp. 135-6, 236-7, 239, 263, 419-24, 426, 551; anti-Irish, p. 237; anti-Jewish,
pp. 238, 419, 422-4; anti-Catholic, pp. 423-4).
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The scope of possible national supervision in this sphere, however, is
narrowly circumscribed by the constitutional prescription of a federal system
under which the primary responsibility for the protection of civil rights has
been left with the states.Y Constriction of national action continues to be
justified upon several grounds: that governmental power should be widely
dispersed among local units to avoid abuse; and that national attempts to
solve local problems encounter lack of cooperation and hostility from local
authorities, and may weaken local responsibility.8
Nevertheless, following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment after
the Civil War, Congress enacted a comprehensive group of statutes designed
to guarantee broad rights of national citizenship.0 Only parts of this
program have escaped judicial invalidation, however, and these have been
limited by the courts' narrow definition of a "federal right." Since the
Slaughterhouse and Civil Rights Cases,'° it has been the theory of the Su-
Nor can the serious international effects of a failure to protect minority groups
in a time of world crisis be ignored. "The United States is not so strong, the final
triumph of the democratic ideal is not so inevitable that we can ignore what th wrorld
thinks of is or our record." Civ. RTs. REP., supra note 1, at 148; see also 146-7. Cf.
Brief for United States, pp. 18-20, McGhee v. Sipes, Oct. Term 1947, No. 87; Coleman,
Freedom from Fear on the Home Front, 29 IowA L. REv. 415 (1944); Cushman, Our
Civil Rights Become a World Issue, N.Y. Times Magazine Section, January 11, 1943,
p. 12; Rotnem, The Federal Civil Right "Not To Be Lynched", 28 VAsu. U. L. Q. 57
(1943) ; 1 Woomnow WI.sox, WAR AND PEACE 238-40 (Baker and Dodd ed. 1927).
7. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 76 (U.S. 1872) (State governments
were created to establish and secure those "fundamental" privileges, "which belong of
right to citizens of all free governments.").
In the civil rights field, it is to be noted that the courts use almost exclusively the
loose terminology associated with the doctrine of natural rights implicit in the Constitu-
tion. Thus, distinctions which may be connoted by such terms as "right", "privilege",
"immunity", "liberty", or "freedom" are frequently blurred and may have no separate sig-
nificance. See KoNvrz, op. cit. mepra note 5, at Preface. Similarly, no attempt is made to
differentiate "natural rights" supposed to be "inalienable" in all men from "effective rights"
which the sovereign has either protected in the past or has indicated its willingness to pro-
tect in the future. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied To Ju-
dicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913), 26 id. 710 (1917) ; Lasswell and McDougal,
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 Y,%=-
L. J. 203, 265-72 (1943) ; McDouoAL AND HABER, Pzosryrv, VEA.mr, LA=D: ALLecA-
TION, PLANNING AND D Lom~zmNr 28 (1948) and authorities cited therein. This
discussion explores the gap between the "natural right" and the "effective right" to be
free from violence.
8. See the statement of then Attorney General Jackson, 1 BILL op RI OIs REv. 34,
35-6 (1940) and his dissent in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 133 (1945). Contrast
President Truman's viewpoint, CIrv. RTs. REP., supra note 1, at vii.
9. The many authorities discussing this program of legislation are collected in
CARR and FRaLExE, op. cit. supra note 2; Fraenkel, sup'ra note 4, at 301; and Ko-;irrz,
op. cit. supra note 5. And cf. Adamson v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947) (concerning
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as it affects civil rights).
10. Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1872); Civil rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883). The Civil Rights Cases, id. at 11-7, followed the distinction beteen the rights
of federal and state citizenship made in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 48-51
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preme Court that Congress may not, even under the terms of the
Fourteenth Amendment, pass "general legislation upon the rights of the
citizen"'1 except where it "is clothed with direct and plenary powers ... "12
Hence "civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution [solely] against
State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, un-
supported by State authority. .. .
But federal powers enumerated under other sections of the Constitution
delimit a number of protected areas which together encompass a limited fed-
eral right to be secure from violence where state authorities fail to accord
protection. The present discussion seeks to define the extent of these areas
and examines possible bases, within the framework of constitutional doctrine,14
for more comprehensive federal action to curb violence toward minorities.
GENERAL STATUTES
Two general criminal statutes authorizing federal prosecution of civil rights
violations survive from the post-Civil War legislation. Section 19 of the
Criminal Code'; allows federal prosecution where private persons conspire to
infringe a right secured to citizens by the Constitution or created thereunder
by federal law. Section 20 of the Criminal Code1 6 provides a basis for federal
action where one clothed with public authority deprives an inhabitant of such
a right; in addition, it protects those rights constitutionally guaranteed against
encroachment only by state action. These general laws are supplemented by
statutes authorizing federal action against individuals in certain specific situa-
tions.
Nevertheless, because of statutory weaknesses and administrative difficulties,
federal pr'otection of minorities has been, and is today, haphazard and in-
adequate.
(1875), and in the Slaughterhouse Cases, supra at 76, based on a, dictum in Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,230, at 551-2 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
For further discussion, compare United States v. Powell, 151 Fed. 648 (C.C.N.D.
Ala. 1907), with Ex parte Riggins, 134 Fed. 404 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1904). Cf. United States
v. Morris, 125 Fed. 322 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1903) (right of Negroes to cultivate land);
United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 885 (C.C.W.D. Ga. 1890) (right to be protected from
threats against court-declared title). Fraenkel, The Federal Civil Rights Law,, 31 MINN.
L. RIv. 301, 305-12, 315-6 (1947). And see cases cited in notes 18-29 infra.
11. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
12. Id. at 18. See note 7 supra.
13. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
14. The Attorney General has recently suggested that the doctrine of the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 et seq. (1883), may be "subject to re-examination" by the Supreme
Court; "Competent scholars have long questioned the correctness of that ruling". Brief
for United States, p. 49, n. 28, Shelley v. Kraemer, U.S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term 1947, No.
72; Statement of the American Jewish Congress, Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4
of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5673, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1948).
15. REv. STAT. § 5508 (1875), as reenacted, 35 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 51
(1940).
16. Rzv. STAT. § 5510 (1875), as reenacted, 35 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 52
(1940).
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Section x9 of the Criminal Code
Section 19 of the Criminal Code is the only general criminal statute
available for federal prosecution of private infringement of civil rights. The
statute provides criminal sanctions-imprisonment up to ten years, fines up to
$5000, and permanent future disability to hold federal office-for participa-
tion in any conspiracy "to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in
the free enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution
or laws of the United States."' 7 But the statute can be used only in a few
situations. Since it is a conspiracy statute, it cannot be used to prosecute
offenders who act alone. Moreover, it refers to "citizens" and has been held
not to offer protection to aliens, even though a treaty with the parent nation
provides that they are to enjoy the rights of citizenship.18
The principal limitation on the use of the section lies in the application of
the Constitutional doctrine restricting the statutory "right" to a "right ...
connected with the powers and duties of the national government."' Thus,
for example, Section 19 does not, according to an early Supreme Court de-
cision, 2° protect a right to assemble peaceably, but would protect the right to
assemble peaceably to petition Congress.2 '
Nevertheless, the general statutory "right" recognized under Section 19
holds interpretive possibilities which the courts have merely begun to explore.
The section has so far been held to extend to cases of interference with
voting at federal elections,z2 intimidation of federal witnesses2 and inform-
17. "If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same,
or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another,
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so
secured, they shall be fined not more than $5,000 and imprisoned not more than ten years,
and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or
trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 35 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18
U.S.C. § 51 (1940).
18. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887). But see Lemn Moon Sing Y. United
States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895) ; In re Baldwin, 27 Fed. 187, 191 (C.C. Cal. 1836) ; In re
Impaneling and Instructing the Grand Jury, 26 Fed. 749, 754 (D. Ore. 1886).
19. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875). ". . . every right created
by, arising under or dependent upon the Constitution of the United States may be pro-
tected and enforced by Congress, by such means and in such manner as Congress, in the
exercise of the correlative duty of protection, or of the legislative powers conferred upon
it by the Constitution, may in its discretion deem most eligible and best adapted to attain
the object." Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 293 (1892) (discussing all the earlier
cases). See pp. 857-8 snpra.
20. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
21. Id. at 552.
22. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) ; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941) ; United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915) ; Wiley v. Sinlder, 179 U.S.
58 (1900) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Aczel, 219 Fed.
917 (D. Ind. 1915), aff'd, 232 Fed. 652 (C.C.A. 7th 1916); FelLx v. United States, 186
Fed. 685 (C.C.A. 5th 1911). See also Rotnem, Clarification of the Ciil Rights Stalttes,
2 B .LoF RIGHTs REv. 252 (1942).
23. Foss v. United States, 266 Fed. 881 (C.C.A. 9th 1920). Contra: United States
v. Sanges, 48 Fed. 78 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1891).
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,ers,2 and violence against federal officers 25 and persons in their custody.20
And in Powe v. United States,2 7 decided in 1940, although a newspaper
editor's right to discuss local matters was held not to be a federal right, it
was indicated that there is a federal right to discuss federal matters.
Section 19 has been useful, furthermore, in providing criminal sanctions
for federal laws lacking penal provisions, such as the Homestead Act, grant-
ing rights to make a homestead entry on public lands,28 and the National Labor
Relations Act.29 Since these statutes establish federal rights, prosecutions may
be brought under Section 19 against those who seek to deprive a person of
their benefits.
But, limited in its application by its phraseology and the present status of
court interpretation, Section 19 "is not the powerful weapon needed to com-
bat the serious situation which exists in the civil rights field today."
8 0
Section 20 of the Cri m l Code
Section 20 of the Criminal Code makes it a misdemeanor for anyone,
"under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully"
to deprive "any inhabitant" of a federally secured right, or to subject him
to different punishments because of alienage, race, or color.8 1 Although Sec-
tion 20 is broader than Section 19 in that it is not a conspiracy statute, and
protects all "inhabitants" rather than just citizens, it had been used in only
24. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) ; In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S.
532 (1895) ; Nicholson v. United States, 79 F.2d 387 (C.C.A. 8th 1935).
25. United States v. Davis, 103 Fed. 457 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1900); United States v.
Patrick, 54 Fed. 338 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1893).
26. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892). Thus Section 19 covers some
lynching situations. For other cases extending the concept of a federal right, see note 10
supra.
27. 109 F.2d 147 (C.C.A. 5th 1940), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 679 (1940). "Because the
federal government is a republican one in which the will of the people ought to prevail,
and because that will ought to be expressive of an informed public opinion, the freedom
of speaking and printing on subjects relating to that government, its elections, its laws,
its operations and its officers is vital to it." Id. at 151.
28. REv. STAT. §2289 (1875), 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1940). United States v. Waddell,
112 U.S. 76 (1884) ; Nixon v. United States, 289 Fed. 177 (C.C.A. 9th 1923).
29. 49 STAT. §§ 449-57 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-66 (1940); United States v. Mary
Helen Coal Co., unreported (C.C. Ky. 1938); CARR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 27 n.38,
also 185-8; Department of Justice Circular No. 3673, April 8, 1942.
30. Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 CoL. L. Ray.
175, 181 (1947); Civil Rights; The Boundless Responsibility of Lawyers, 32 A.B.A.J.
453 (1946).
31. "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains or
penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race,
than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both." 35 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1940).
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two reported cases before 1939.32 Since that time it has received a thorough
examination in Screws v. Uzited States.33 A Georgia sheriff, angered when
a Negro engaged counsel to recover a pistol seized from him by the sheriff,
arrested the Negro and, without justification, beat and kicked him to death.
After the Justice Department's "strenuous efforts" to persuade Georgia to
act had failed, the United States Attorney General initiated prosecution.
Indictments were obtained from a federal grand jury, the defendants were
convicted,36 and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction 3 7 On
appeal to the Supreme Court, four justices felt that Section 20 could be held
constitutional against the charge of vagueness only if the jury were properly
instructed on the element of "wilfulness." 38 Since this instruction had not
been given, the case was sent back for a new trial. Justices Frankfurter,
Roberts, and Jackson dissented on the ground that Section 20 was confined to
"attempted deprivations of federal rights by State law"30 and did not cover
breaches thereof by state officials, so that the defendant's act was not done
"under color" of state law; and also that the entire statute failed to meet the
standard of definiteness required in criminal statutes. Justices Murphy and
Rutledge felt the conviction should be sustained, the former arguing that
however invalid other applications of Section 20 might be, it was properly
used in this situation, where questions of "vagueness" and "lack of warning"
to the defendants were scarcely applicable considering the nature of the
crime.40
32. United States v. Stone, 188 Fed. 836 (D. Md. 1911); United States v. Buntin, 10
Fed. 730 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882).
33. 325 U.S. 91 (1945), 55 YALE L. J. 576 (1946) ; Carr, Screws t,. United States,
31 Coma. L. Q. 48 (1945) ; Cohen, The Screws Case: Federal Protection of Negro Rights.
46 Cor. L. REv. 94 (1946) ; Coleman, supra note 6, at 423-4.
34. The local authorities "felt helpless in the matter" because of the necessity of re-
lying on the accused himself to gather the evidence. And for the state's attorney to seek
an indictment involved a complicated process which could be blocked at the county level.
Brief for United States, p. 50, Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); CAnA op.
cit. supra note 2, at 107; Note, 55 YAi.z L. J. 576, 583, and n. 64 (1946). The dissenters,
nevertheless, criticized the federal government's prosecution: "Instead of leaving this
misdeed to vindication by Georgia law, the United States deflected Georgia's responsibility
by instituting a federal prosecution." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 138 (1945).
35. "The Department of Justice has established a policy of strict self-limitation v'ith
regard to prosecutions under the civil rights acts. When violations of such statutes are
reported, the Department requires that efforts be made to encourage state officials to take
appropriate action under state law." Brief for the Government, Id. at 48-9.
36. See CAP.R, op. cit. supra note 2, at 133-46.
37. 140 F.2d 662 (C.C.A. 5th 1944).
38. 325 U.S. 91, 92-113 (1945). Justice Rutledge voted with this group to make
possible a disposition of the case.
Theoretically, the requirement would be equally applicable to prosecutions under
Section 19, although there are no cases which have so held. But cf. note 81 infra.
39. Id. at 143. See note 8 supra.
40. Id. at 134-8. See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221-4
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The case settled the constitutionality of Section 20, and established under
"color" of law as meaning that the section applied to state officials acting
under "pretense" of law,41 but the Court's requirement that "wilfulness" be
tested by a "specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite
by decision or other law . . .,,42 suggested a road of escape to miscreants. The
requirement would seem to limit the applicability of Section 20 not merely to
rights implicitly protected by the Constitution against state infringement, but
to rights made explicit by its language, or already spelled out in decision or
statute.43 Thus, an offender who could persuade the jury that he intended only
a simple assault would avoid federal penalties. As a result, subsequent pros-
ecutions may be impeded.44
In lynching situations, Section 20 is useful only where a public officer is
involved. It might be used (1) where a public officer conspires with a mob
to lynch, or actively assists a mob in lynching; (2) where a posse, deputized
(1914), where the vagueness test was first announced by the Supreme Court; Note, 55
YALE L. J. 576, 580 and n. 36 (1946) ; Note, 45 H.Rv. L. Rv. 160 (1931).
Compare Mr. Justice Murphy's dissent in United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 530
(1944), with his opinion herein; also note the individual philosophies of the Justices
expressed in United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944), and United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941).
41. 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941);
Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791, 792 (C.C.A. 2d 1946) ; Catlette v. United States,
132 F.2d 902, 905-6 (C.C.A. 4th 1943). See also Fraenkel, supra note 4, at 320-1.
42. 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945).
43. The Attorney General has interpreted the requirement: The accused "must have
at the time he commits the offense the clear purpose of depriving his victim of a specific
federal right, i.e., a right which has been made specific either by the express terms of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or by decisions interpreting them." Clark, A
Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 Coi. L. REv. 175, 182 (1947).
Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 113 (1945),
construed the requirement less strictly than the Court: "Generally state officials know
something of the individual's basic legal rights. If they do not, they should, for they as-
sume that duty.... If their knowledge is not comprehensive, state officials know or
should know when they pass the limits of their authority, so far at any rate that their
action exceeds honest error of judgment and amounts to abuse . . . their sworn oath and
their first duty are to uphold the Constitution, then only the law of the state .... Since
the statute [Section 20] . . . condemns only something more than error of judgment . . .
officials who violate it must act in intentional or reckless disregard of individual rights
and cannot be ignorant that they do great wrong... ." Id. at 129-30.
44. On retrial of the Screws case, the defendants were acquitted. The local United
States Attorney reported that the judge's charge, based on the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of wilfulness, was very damaging to the Government's case. CAa, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 115; Clark, mpra note 43, at 182; Civ. Rvs. REP., supra note 1, at 157.
At least one prosecution since the Screws case, however, has succeeded notwithstand-
ing this difficulty. Compare the discussion of wilfulness in Crews v. United States, 160
F.2d 746 (C.C.A. 5th 1947), affirming a conviction under Section 20, "If . . . an officer
vents his malice upon a prisoner and deprives him of a constitutional right, this manifesta-
tion and use of personal spleen need not necessarily negative the fact that such officer
might at the same time have also acted with the conscious and wilful purpose of depriving
the prisoner of constitutional rights." Id. at 749-50.
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or led by a public officer, kills a person without justification;45 or (3) against
private persons participating in a lynching with an official liable under Sec-
tion 20, by combining Section 20 with the general conspiracy statute or with
the statute defining principals to a conspiracy.'0 This combination might be
necessary in a situation where the victim is not a citizen, or was seized from
state custody, and the private persons involved could not be prosecuted under
Section 19. Such a combination of Section 20 and the general conspiracy
statute has been successfully employed to prosecute a sheriff, a jail trusty,
and a lawyer guilty of collaborating to maintain a "kangaroo" court, where
money was extorted by force from persons improperly arrested and heldA
Since violation of Section 20 is a misdemeanor, it is possible to employ a
criminal information" when a grand jury refuses to return an indictment
because of local hostility to the prosecution, and significant convictions have
been secured by this method.49
SPECIAL STATUTES
Criminal Sanctions
In addition to the actions possible under these statutes, the federal govern-
ment may also prosecute private persons or public officials in a few specific
statutory situations.
It is a misdemeanor under the Hatch Political Activity Act to "intimidate,
threaten, or coerce, or to attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce" any voter at
a federal election.50 Protection of the Hatch Act Is, however, been held not
to extend to primaries since a provision for such coverage was eliminated from
the original bill.51 Another provision of the Act makes it a misdemeanor to
"deprive, or attempt to deprive, or threaten to deprive" a person of federal
relief or work benefits because of race, color, creed, or political activity.52
The substantially similar Section 30 of the Emergency Relief Appropriations
Act of 193953 has been used in connection with a primary election at which
45. United States v. Trierweiler, 52 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Ill. 1943).
46. 35 STAT. 1096 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 88 (1940); 35 STAT. 1152 (1909), 18 U.S.C.
§550 (1940).
47. Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d 93 (C.C.A. 8th 1942).
48. 46 STAT. 1029 (1930), 18 U.S.C. § 541 (1940).
49. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (C.C.A. 4th 1943) ; United States v.
Buchanan, unreported, Department of Justice Case No. 144-14-1 (1943); United States
v. Ersldne, unreported, Department of Justice Case No. 144-68-9 (1943); CAmr, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 159-60, 185-6; Coleman, supra note 6, at 423-4.
50. 53 STAT. 1147 (1939), 18 U.S.C. § 61 (1940).
51. United States v. Malphurs, 41 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Fla. 1941). See Mr. Justice
Douglas, dissenting in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 337-9 (1941). The Civil
Rights Section of the Department of Justice has been criticized for its failure to attempt
further utilization of this section of the Hatch Act. CAM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 178-9.
52. 53 STAT. 1147 (1939), 18 U.S.C. §61 (c) (1940).
53. 53 STAT. 927, 937 (1939), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 721-728 (Supp. 1947).
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candidates for federal office were nominated,54 and to prosecute persons re-
sponsible for violent picketing of a WPA project5
Intimidation of a federal witness-any witness before a federal court or
commissioner, or a federal investigative or administrative committee or agency
-is a misdemeanor under Sections 185 and 135 (a) of the Criminal Code.60
The protection offered by these sections has been extended to include pro-
spective witnesses before such agencies. 7
Enacted under the more inclusive terms of the Thirteenth Amendment,68
the federal criminal statute prohibiting peonage 9-"a status or condition of
compulsory service, based upon a real or alleged indebtedness of the peon to
the master"6°--has been liberally construed by the courts.0 1 During the last
few years, the Act has been successfully used to prosecute a variety of forms
of involuntary servitude.62 In situations where no debt is involved, but the
laborer is compelled by force or threats of force to remain at work, the
prosecution may be brought under the ancient Slave Kidnapping Act,63 or one
54. United States v. Malphurs, 46 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. Fla. 1942).
55. Unreported. Schweinhaut, spra note 2, at 203. An attempt was made to apply it
in Alabama against a Farm Security Administration supervisor who allegedly tried to
force certain Negroes to give up the benefits of a farm security loan. Ibid.
56. 59 STAT. 234 (1945), 18 U.S.C. §§241, 241(a) (Supp. 1946).
57. "If he knows or is supposed to know material facts, and is expected to testify to
them, or be called on to testify, he is a witness." Odom v. United States, 116 F.2d 996, 998
(C.C.A. 5th 1941), reV/d on other grounds, 313 U.S. 544 (1941).
58. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S.
CoNsT. AMEND. XIII.
59. "Whoever holds, arrests, returns, or causes to be held, arrested, or returned, or
in any manner aids in the arrest or return of any person to a condition of peonage, shall
be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both," REv.
STAT. § 5526 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 444 (1940).
60. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242-3 (1911) ; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S.
207,215 (1905).
61. United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527 (1944); Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671
(M.D. Ala. 1903).
62. United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527 (1944) ; Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d
84 (C.C.A. 5th 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945) ; United States v. Johnson, un-
reported, Department of Justice Case No. 50-17-9 (1944). CAm, oP. cit. suPra note 2,
at 180-2. Department of Justice Circular No. 3591, December 12, 1941. Peonage offenses
are not uncommon today. Civ. RTs. REP., supra note 1, at 29-30. For a curious survival
of the outmoded notion that the debt be evidenced by an express contract, see dissenting
opinion in Pierce v. United States, supra at 86.
63. "Whover kidnaps or carries away any other person, with the intent that such other
person be sold into involuntary servitude, or held as a slave; or who entices, persuades,
or induces any other person to go on board any vessel or to any other place with the in-
tent that he may be made or held as a slave, or sent out of the country to be so made or
held; or who in any way knowingly aids in causing any other person to be held, sold, or
carried away to be held or sold as a slave, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or im-
[Vol. 57: 855
19481 FEDERAL POWER TO PROSECUTE VIOLENCE 865
of the general criminal statutes discussed above?'4
Civil Remedies
Supplementing available criminal penalties, federal statutes grant injured
persons a civil suit for redress in the federal courts,0 5 but these laws have
proved ineffective to protect minority groups from violence because the right
has been limited to a cause of action against a public official who infringes a
federally guaranteed right.6  It has been suggested that the civil remedy be
combined with a system of bonding public officers." But granting the desirabil-
ity of the reform, civil remedies would still be inadequate, because the victims
of these deprivations ordinarily lack funds 8 to maintain a prosecution, and the
standing in the community to arouse support.0 0
prisoned not more than five years, or both." REv. STAT. § 5525 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 443
(1940). United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947); United States v.
Skrobarscek, unreported, Department of Justice Case No. 50-74-6; Crm, op. cit. mpra
note 2, at 182; Folsom, A Slave Trade Law in a Contemporary Setting, 29 Cou.:. L. Q.
203 (1943).
64. See pp. 858-63 supra. Smith v. United States, 157 Fed. 721 (C.C.A. 8th 1907)
(under Section 19 of the Criminal Code). Contra: United States v. Eberhart, 127 Fed.
254 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1899) (indictment alleging defendants forced victim to sign contract
for work; no federal offense stated).
65. Rnv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1940); R'v. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 8
U.S.C. § 47 (1940) ; REv. STAT. § 1981 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 48 (1940).
66. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 13 (1944); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 495,
509-11 (1939) ; Bomar v. Bogart, 159 F.2d 338, 339 (C.C.A. 2d 1947) ; Picking V. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 248-50 (C.C.A. 3d 1945) ; Love v. Chandler, 124 F2d 785,
786 (C.C.A. 8th 1942); Allan v. Corsano, 56 F. Supp. 169, 171-2 (D. Del. 1944). The
victims in Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (C.C.A. 4th 1943), brought suits result-
ing in a compromise settlement of $5228 to each victim. CAm, op. cit. supra note 2, at 157.
Nevertheless, many suits have been brought against public officers for various forms
of non-violent discrimination. These have been useful in expanding the concept of state
action. See pp. 871-2 infra. Election natters: Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
(party convention resolution excluding Negroes from party primaries held state action) ;
Chapman v. King, 154 F-2d 460 (C.C.A. 5th 1946), cert. denied, 37 U.S. 8O0 (1946)
(damages recoverable against local party authorities who deny Negro right to vote in a
federal primary election). But cf. Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 50 (LD. Ala.
1945) (unsuccessful class action for Negroes denied right to vote). Discrimiiha-
tion in teachers" salaries: Alston v. Norfolk, 112 F2d 992 (C.C.A. 4th 1940), ccrt.
denied, 311 U.S. 693 (1940) (Negro teachers entitled to injunction against dis-
crimination in salary rates). Discrimination in librarian selection: Kerr v. Enoch Pratt
Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (C.C.A. 4th 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945) (denial
to Negress of opportunity to train as librarian by private governing board of library
supported with city funds held state action). In Refoule v. Ellis ct al., 74 F. Supp. 336
(N.D. Ga. 1947), a preliminary injunction was granted a French citizen to restrain police
officers from improperly taking him into custody on suspicion of moricide.
67. Recommendation of Circuit Judge Jerome Frank in his seminar in Fact Finding
at Yale Law School, November, 1947.
68. Civ. RTs. REP., supra note 1, at 25; CARR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21-2.
69. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chief Justice designate of the New Jersey Supreme Court,
and Past President of the American Bar Ass'n, has described the situation: "The in-
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POSSIBLE BASES FOR INCREASED FEDERAL SUPERVISION
Beyond the present reach of federal authority, there lies a "no-man's" land
where violence or threatened violence may continue uninhibited by effective
societal sanctions."0 Unless the violation falls within the limited area covered
by special statutes, private non-conspiratorial acts of aggression toward minor-
ities are immune from federal prosecution. Nor, even when there is evidence
of conspiracy, may federal power be exercised against lynchers who seize
their victim from blameless state officials, 1 or against vigilantes who drive
"radicals" out of their homes and deport them from the state,72 or who use
violence to force Negroes out of their jobs.1 3
Nevertheless, without disturbing the organic pattern of the federal system,
a more vigorous federal enforcement program to realize the full potentiali-
ties of present laws, combined with statutory amendment and broader
court interpretation, can considerably enlarge the protection of minorities.
Administrative Reform
In the enforcement field, the Justice Department faces peculiarly difficult
problems arising out of strong local hostility in many parts of the country.
4
Moreover, the Civil Rights Section in the Department 0 must at present carry
on its activities with an inadequate staff and no investigative force under its
control. As a result, although deluged with complaints since its establishment
in 1939 by the then Attorney General (now Mr. Justice Murphy), it has
prosecuted but a tiny fraction of the many thousands received, and has ob-
tained convictions in a lesser number.
76
dividual whose constitutional rights are assailed is generally a member of an unpopular
minority. . . .The lawyer who essays to aid an unpopular cause is subject to peculiar
social pressures. His old and valued clients are likely to intimate to him ...that he
might better devote his energies to their own vastly more important affairs. Does he not
fear, they quietly insinuate, that by sponsoring strange causes he may lose [his] reputation
for sober judgment and social soundness. . . ." 1 BILL Op RGrTs Rmv. 42 (1940).
70. See Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 CoL. L.
Ray. 175, 181 (1947).
71. United States v. Powell, 151 Fed. 648 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907). See Rotnem, supra
note 6, at 67-8.
72. United States v. Wheeler, 245 U.S. 281 (1920). The validity of the holding Is
doubted today. Meyers, Federal Privileges and Immunities: Applied to Ingress and
Egress, 29 Comr. L. Q. 489 (1944) ; CAaa, op. cit. supra note 2, at 188-9.
73. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). The power of the federal govern-
ment in respect to protection of jobs is increased by the federal rights created under the
National Labor Relations Act. See note 29 supra.
74. These problems are examined in detail in CAna, op. cit. supra note 2.
75. A detailed history and analysis of the Civil Rights Section is found in the study
made by the former Executive Secretary of the President's Committee on Civil Rights,
CARR, op. cit. supra note 2.
76. While it is commonly asserted that the Civil Rights Section has received nearly
seventy thousand complaints during its existence this number in fact represents all mail
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To dissipate the ignorance and lack of concern which surrounds the prob-
lem of the protection of minority rights,7 7 Congress could establish a perma-
nent version of the President's Committee on Civil Rights to further national
education. In addition, Congress could see that the Justice Department Civil
Rights Section is no longer hampered by lack of personnel and funds.78 For,
although the Section suffers from the laxity and submission to local pressure
on the part of United States Attorneys in many parts of the country,70 its
comparatively few prosecutions have had beneficial effects sufficient to recom-
mend a continuance and enlargement of its work. 0 Expansion of the Section
and its activities would seem particularly important, if statutory reform to
broaden the base of rights federally protected is to be considered.
Statutory Amendvwnt
In its Report, the President's Committee recommended legislation amending
Section 19 and supplementing Section 20. Appreciating that the content of
Section 19 must depend largely upon the extent to which the courts will
recognize a federal right to be free from private aggression, the Committee did
received by the Section. About thirteen thousand complaints have been concerned with
possible invasions of federal rights. Up to January 1, 1947, the Civil Rights Section had
instituted action in 178 cases, obtaining 101 convictions, and convicting 130 defendants.
Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statute, 47 COi. L. Rv. 175,
181 (1947) ; CAm, op. cit. supra note 2, at 125-33; for the Department of Justice policy
of strict self-limitation, see note 35 supra.
77. '" . . there is a very great and urgent need for a national program of education
that the man on the street be made to realize that every attack upon the constitutional
rights of others ... weakens the fabric of the Constitution itself. Such a program should
commend itself to the organized bar of the country, and if this nation cannot afford
martyrs and the followers they inspire, the lawyer should accept, willingly and earnestly,
his share in that educational effort." Schweinhaut, supra note 2, at 216; Clark, Civil
Rights:The Bouwidless Responsibility of La iyers, 32 A.B.A.J. 453, 457 (1946).
78. "At no time since its creation has the Civil Rights Section occupied more than
four or five modest office rooms in the Justice Department building, or had more than
eight or ten lawyers and professional workers on its staff, assisted by three or four clerks
and stenographers." CArup, op. cit. supra note 2, at 122. See recommendations in Crv.
Ris. REP., supra note 1, at 151-5.
79. CARiz, op. cit. supra note 2, at 133-46.
80. After an acquittal in a police brutality case, the United States Attorney wrote
to the Attorney General: "The defendants are at liberty, but it is my humble opinion
that the prosecution will do good for years to come. None of these state officers likes
to be hauled into Federal Court ... ." Crv. Ris. REP., supra note 1, at 128-9. After
an acquittal in a lynching case, an attorney who had served as a special assistint wrote:
"The trial of the case impressed officers from the Governor down to the Constables with
the importance of an officer according to a prisoner the highest degree of protection."
Ibid. After a lynching indictment, the Attorney General of Mississippi w-as claimed to
have '" . . stated to me that in his judgment the indictment will have a fine moral
effect in Mississippi.... ." CARa, op. cit. supra note 2, at 145. "The conviction received
favorable notice in many Southern papers and there seems little doubt that this case...
has been effective in breaking up at least the direct practice of peonage." Id. at 181.
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not attempt to enumerate more specifically the offenses subject to its penalty.81
Instead, the Committee confined its recommendations to changes in the con-
spiracy and penalty provisions of the statute. It proposed: (1) that federal
prosecution be extended thereunder to private individual offenders ;82 and (2)
that the provision which prohibits anyone convicted under the Section from
holding any federal office be eliminated.83 It has been shown that this
provision is a serious deterrent to convictions, and does not add sufficient
strength to the law to warrant its retention84 In addition to these recom-
mended revisions, other changes may be desirable. At the present time, only
federal rights of "citizens" are protected against private infringement; the
protection might well be extended to all "inhabitants." Inclusion within the
statute's coverage of all rights guaranteed by "treaties" of the United States
would further ensure aliens' rights, and reinforce the argument tht these
laws must be viewed in the light of the United Nations Charter.8 5
The considerations which restrain a more precise delineation of offenses
punishable under Section 19 are absent in the case of aggression by public
officers.8 6 To supplement Section 20, therefore, the Committee urged the
enactment of laws specifically enumerating rights such as "the right not to be
deprived of property by a public officer except by due process of law; the
right to be free from personal injury inflicted by a public officer; the right to
engage in a lawfuf activity without interference by a public officer; and the
right to be free from discriminatory law enforcement resulting from either
active or passive conduct by a public officer."' ' 7
Behind this recommendation lie the implications of the Screws decision.
Directly responsible for the narrow interpretation of "wilfulness" in that
case, the lack of enumeration in Section 20 poses a threat to future prosecu-
tions under the Section.88 The necessity of proving a "specific intent" militates
81. Section 19 has already been given a content, lacking in Section 20, by numerous
cases and statutes. See discussion, pp. 859-60 supra. Further enumeration would be super-
fluous where the courts have already recognized the rights enumerated; and, since federal
authority over private offenses is limited, would be of dubious constitutional validity where
those rights have not yet received judicial approval.
82. An amendment has already been introduced to make this change. U. R. 4471,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
83. Crv. Rrs. REP., supra note 1, at 156.
84. Ibid.
85. In adhering to the United Nations Charter, the United States pledged itself to
"promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for alt."
Ar. 55(c), United Nations Charter, 59 STAT. 1031 (1945). Since treaties are the
"supreme law of the land," U.S. CoNsr., Art. VI, and since Congress has the power to
define and punish offenses against the law of nations, U.S. CoNST., Art. I, §8(10),
Congress may have, under the Charter, power to protect minorities not vested by the
Constitution itself. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
86. See note 81 supra. Section 20 figured in only two reported cases before 1939.
See note 32 supra.
87. Civ. RTs. REP., supra note 1, at 157.
88. See discussion p. 862 supra.
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against statement of the offense itself in general terms. Consequently, al-
though the present statute indicates an intention to protect against public
officers any right or privilege under the Constitution, the enumeration of
specific offenses would serve a not unnecessary purpose in furnishing concrete
standards of "wilfulness."8 9 In addition, enumeration could point the way
for courts to effectuate, consistent with the Constitution, the full intent of
Congress."
Further legislation supplementing both general and special statutes has been
proposed. As enumeration extends the range of federal protection, how-
ever, constitutional questions increasingly intrude.9 ' Certainly there is no
problem in strengthening the Peonage and Slave Kidnapping Acts ;2 the
plenary powers reserved to Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment could
be utilized in legislation precisely defining not only peonage but other forms of
involuntary servitude as well.93 But the pending Case BillG declaring a
federal "right to be free from lynching," may indeed challenge traditional
concepts of constitutional interpretation. 5 The Bill provides penalties for
89. Since offenses under Section 19 have in effect been enumerated by various
court decisions, the barrier to successful prosecution under Section 20 erected by the
Screws decision is not as likely to cause difficulty in the prosecution of private offenses.
90. It has been suggested that enumeration may present an additional problem: If
the offense is not enumerated, does the doctrine of expressio u nius est exclu uio alterias
apply to mean that the offense is not punishable? See Fraenkel, Tic Fcderal Civul Rights
Law, 31 ]flNN. L. Ray. 301, 326 (1947). The difficulty could be obviated, however, by
language preceding the enumeration such as "including but not limited to," and careful
explanation of the bill by its sponsors.
91. Thus, the recommended enumeration, under Section 20, of a specific right "to be
free from discriminatory law enforcement resulting from either active or passive conduct
by a public officer" might raise a constitutional issue. See discussion p. 871 inIra.
92. See notes 59, 63 supra.
93. See cases cited notes 61, 62, 64 supra.
94. H. R. 5673, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
95. The right to be free from lynching was held to be a federal right in Ex parle
Riggins, 134 Fed. 404 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1904), under the statute from which the present
Section 19 was reenacted, REv. STAT. §5508 (1375), on the ground that the Fourteenth
Amendment authorized Congress both to prevent positive state action against federal
rights, and "to aid the state" in performing its duty to guarantee due process of law by
removing resistance thereto by private violence.
But this decision was in effect overruled by the same court in United States v. Powell,
151 Fed. 648 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907), by construing Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1 (1906), decided subsequent to the Riggits case, "as a binding authority that no
right, privilege, or immunity in respect of due process, at any stage in the duty of afford-
ing it, arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, unless there be denial of the right by the
state or its officers, and that no immunity whatever is secured under the Constitution or
laws.., against lawlessness of private individuals which frustrates the state's efforts
to perform its constitutional duty, although thereby all enjoyment of the benefits of due
process be prevented." Id. at 664. The Powell case was affirmed without opinion by the
Supreme Court, 212 U.S. 564 (1909).
And see Recent Statutes, The Federal Anti-Lynching Bill, 38 COL. L. Rcv. 199
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private individuals who participate in a conspiracy to invade that right or
who instigate or aid in a lynching; and for public officers from whose neglect
or wilful failure to act lynching results or is allowed to go unpunished.90 In
addition, the Bill makes the governmental subdivision within which such de-
privations occur financially responsible to the victim or his survivors.07 Backed
by a firm statement of Congressional intent based on specific findings,0 8 the
proposed statute may perhaps be reminiscent of the Commerce Clause legisla-
tion which induced the new Court to sanction the exercise by Congress of
"an affirmative power commensurate with the national needs." 0  If lynch-
ing is a national problem, it too should be capable of solution through powers
entrusted to Congress under the federal system. But solution requires a
reappraisal of current theory by the courts themselves.
Judicial Interpretation
One approach to the problem is suggested in the series of cases arising tin-
der Section 19. The dictum in the Powe case that there is a federal right to
discuss the national "government, its elections, its laws, its operations, and
its officers"' 00 affords a significant rationale for bringing many forms of
private violence within the reach of the express and implied powers entrusted
to Congress by the Constitution. Whether these powers have been exercised
solely by the enactment of Section 19, or whether they have been exercised in
particular legislation,-such as the recent National Labor Relations Act, the
Social Security Act, the Wages and Hours Act, the Lanham Act (housing),
and the Selective Service Act (veterans' reemployment) ,-the courts clearly
have a basis for enlarging the category of rights federally secured against private
encroachment. The technique suggested by the Powe opinion, however, is
capable of only limited application. If carried to the extremes advanced by
some proponents of anti-lynching legislation,101 it would permit the federal
(1938) : "That Congress could not under the Fourteenth Amendment make lynching itself
a Federal crime is perfectly clear. . . ." Id. at 200.
96. Members of lynch mobs or individuals inciting or aiding a lynching would be
fined up to $10,000, or imprisoned up to twenty years, or both. Public officials guilty of
wilful neglect would be fined up to $5,000, or imprisoned up to five years, or both. H. R.
5673, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3,4 (1947).
97. Subdivisions where lynchings occur would be liable to the victim of the lynching
or the next of kin for not less than $2,000 or more than $10,000. The subdivision would
be permitted, as an affirmative defense, to show by a preponderance of evidence that its
public officers used all diligence to protect the victim. Id. § 6.
98. Id.§1.
99. North American Co. v. S.E.C., 327 U.S. 686, 705-6, 710-1 (1946).
100. Powe v. United States, 109 F.2d 147, 151 (C.C.A. 5th 1940).
101. A former chief of the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice has
found a federal right "not to be lynched" implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment. Rotnem,
The Federal Civil Right "Not To Be Lynched", 28 WAsH. U. L. Q. 57 (1943): "A person
tried in the state courts has a theoretical right to have the state court's determination
reviewed in the light of the due process clause under the federal judicial power .... To
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government to prosecute any act of private violence. Such an extension of
principle proves too much. If federal power can be extended so far, then the
fact of a federal system is destroyed while only the form remains.
A solution less far-reaching in its implications may perhaps come from
the line of decisions defining, under Section 20, the bounds of federal action
against state aggression. For the Fourteenth Amendment provides direct
federal surveillance over the actions of the states themselves, in order to un-
derline, rather than to undermine, their primary responsibility for individual
safety. Thus, it may be forcefully argued that states are as much responsible
for sins of omission as of commission. 0 2 When it can be shown that local au-
thorities, aware of the probable occurrence of violence, have refused protection
to the victim, prosecution should be feasible on the basis of Section 20 alone. If
authorities have, over a period of time, unequally applied state criminal
statutes, or have wilfully neglected, in a single instance, to prosecute the
authors of private violence, it may also be possible through the penalties of
Section 20 to remind them of their responsibility. In either case, the passage
of supplementary legislation categorizing these particular derelictions as fed-
eral offenses should not encounter serious constitutional objections.
But the inaction of state officers is only a part of a lynching neither pre-
vented nor punished. May not a lynch mob itself be recognized, under these
deprive a person of the opportunity for a reviewable trial, then, is to deprive him of a
right that is not only secured to him by the Federal Constitution but enforceable and
enforced in the federal courts,--in brief, it is to interfere with the administration of
federal justice, in this sense, itself." Id. at 68. Cf. note 95 supra.
A constitutional basis is also sought in the clause guaranteeing each state "a re-
publican form of government," U.S. Consr., Art. IV, § 4; in the Commerce Clause, in
that lynching is essentially an economic problem, U.S. Co.;sr., Art. I, § 8(3) ; in aid of
the power to make treaties and to define and punish offenses against the law of nations,
in connection with the United Nations Charter, see note 85 mspra; and by analogies to
the Lindbergh Anti-Kidnapping Act, 48 STAT. 781 (1934), 18 U.S.C. § 403a (1940), and
National Stolen Property Act, 48 STAT. 794 (1934), 18 U.S.C. § 413 (1940). See Ma-
jority Report, H. R. RaP. No. 1597, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1948); Statement of
American Civil Liberties Union and American Jewish Congress, Hearings before Sub-
committee No. 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary on HR. 5673, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
99, 111 (1948). Con-stitutional Basis for Federal Anti-Lynching Legislation, 6 IAw.
Gunin Rav. 643 (1946).
See generally: Recent Statutes, The Federal Anti-Lynching Bill, 38 Cox. L. F .
199 (1938); Note, The Constitutionality of the Wagner-Costigan Anti-Lynching Bill,
2 Gm. WAsHr. L. Rav. 498 (1934); Dyer, The Constitutionality of a Fcderal Anti-
Lynching Bill, 13 ST. Louis L. Rav. 186 (1928). For impassioned presentations of the
opposite viewpoint, see Minority Report, H. R. REP. No. 1597, S0th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1948), and Hemphill and Woodward, Constitutionality of the Proposed Anti-
Lynching Bill, 2 Uxiv. OF So. CAY. SEaLDFX Soc. YE=n Bm 12 (1938). See also
KoNvrrz, op. cit. supra note 5, at 746; Walter, Proposals for a Federal Anti-Lyrnhirg
Law, 28 Am. PoL. Sc. Ray. 436 (1934).
102. That state inaction, i.e., wilful failure to protect persons from violence, is equiva-
lent to state action, was recognized in the recent Circuit Court of Appeals case of Catlette
v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (C.CA. 4th 1943), although doubts were there suggested
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circumstances, as an organ of the state?103 Since the Civil Rights Cascs, in-
terpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment has progressively departed from an
inquiry focused on the agency formally clothed with power1°' and has ap-
proached instead a search for the agency effectively exercising power.10 5 A
lawless sheriff can only with difficulty be held up as the legal representative of
a sovereign state, but he must be recognized as the source of governmental
power in his own bailiwick. 106 A political party has been held to differ
significantly from a gentlemen's club,O7 a thoroughfare in a company town is
something more than a private right of way, 08 and a labor union may acquire a
measure of responsibility proportionate to its exercise of economic sover-
whether inaction alone would support the imposition of criminal liability. A lower
federal court so held in 1874: ". . . if the outrages and crimes shown to have been
committed in the case before you were well known to the community at large, and that
community and the officers of the law wilfully failed to employ the means provided by
law to ferret out and bring to trial the offenders, because of the victim being colored, it
is a depriving them of the equal protection of the laws." Krekel, J., charging tho jury in
United States v. Blackburn, 24 Fed. Cas. 1158, 1159, No. 14603 (W.D. Mo. 1874).
103. Majority Report, H. R. REP. No. 1597, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948). See
Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Com-
pulsion, 35 COL L. REv. 149 (1935): "'The State' ... is thought to have a mo-
nopoly of . . . political power. Those who wield this official power we have subjected
to ... constitutional limitations. Yet much of this recognized political power is not
different ... from much of the power that some individuals and private groups can
lawfully exercise against other individuals." Id. at 149. ". . . the courts have been
blind to the fact that much of the private power over others is in fact delegated by the
state, and that all of it is 'sanctioned' in the sense of being permitted . .. [T]he courts
*. . might have recognized the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to private ex-
ertions of power.. ." Id. at 199. See also Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203 (1943) :
"... the identity of the institutions that exert power can only be determined by proper
investigation, and must not be taken for granted through verbal coincidence." Id. at 219.
Cf. Kelsen, Law and Justice in the Pure Theory of Law, 57 YALE L. J. 377, 380-1 (1948).
104. The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment refer ". . . to actions of the political
body denominated a State, by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action
may take ... A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities.
It can act in no other way." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879). See also
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639
(1882) ; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) ; Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
105. See generally, Note, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to Private
Organizations, 61 HARv. L. REv. 344 (1948); Barnett, What is "State" Action under
The Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amcndments of the Constlitution?, 24 Omn.
L. REv. 227 (1945) ; Comment, Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 YALE L. J. 426, 433
ff. (1948); Koivrrz, op. cit. supra note 5, at 77-9; 3 WILLOUaGIBY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW ix THE UNrrE STATES 1934-35 (2d ed. 1929); Department of Justice Circular
No. 3356, Supp. 1, 20-1, (1940).
106. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
107. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944); Elmore v. Rice, 7 F. Supp. 516
(D.S.C. 1947).
108. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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eignty-.' 9 A lynching may more than coincidentally be characterized by state
inaction. At least for its purposes, a lynch mob displaces formal state author-
ity. Through tacit ratification, the displacement can become permanent.
Whether lynching is today a national problem remains to be settled on the
basis of evidence not here examined. But Congressional enactment of the Case
Bill would carry a strong presumption in the affirmative. And the solution
should be capable of accommodation in the federal system contemplated by the
Constitution.
109. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946) ; 56 YAu L J. 731 (1947).
Mr. Justice' Murphy, concurring in Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 193,
208 (1944).
